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Many models of the labor market involve explicit or implicit assump- 
tions about the role of supervision.  For instance, the efficiency wage liter- 
ature assumes that supervision  serves a monitoring function,  and that,  other 
things equal,  increased supervision will be associated with lower wages. In 
contrast, if employees dislike being closely monitored,  the theory of equaliz- 
ing differences suggests that closely supervised workers would receive a wage 
1 
premium.  Finally,  agency and tournament models are predicated on the as- 
sumption that employees are imperfectly monitored and supervised. 
Despite the importance of supervision in models of labor market behav- 
ior,  very little is known about the relationship between supervision  and pay, 
or about the organization and effectiveness of supervision within firms. A 
better understanding of the structure and impact of supervision is needed to 
understand its role in production.  The goal of this paper is to document 
several facts regarding the extent of supervision at the workplace,  and to 
measure its effect on the pay of nonsupervisory employees.  The paper makes 
use of a Bureau of Labor Statistics  (BLS)  industry wage survey of the hospital 
industry.  The hospital industry is the focus of our analysis because it has 
well-defined lines of supervision,  because unusually rich employer-reported 
data are available for a sample of hospitals,  and because independent local 
regulating authorities may impose exogenous supervisory intensity on hospi- 
tals. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the data set 
that we use.  Section I1 presents our basic findings on the structure of pay 
and supervision.  Section I11 examines the effect of supervision on pay for 
four occupations.  Section IV offers some concluding observations on the role 
of supervision in the labor market. 
The principal findings of our analysis are summarized as follows: 
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occupations.  Therefore,  if one occupation in a given hospital is paid a rela- 
tively high wage,  the other occupations in the hospital are also likely to be 
paid a relatively high wage.  2)  In contrast to pay, there is not a uniform 
pattern of supervisory intensity across occupations within hospitals. 
3)  Among nurses,  the more intensively that staff workers are supervised, the 
lower their pay.  A similar trade-off between supervision and pay is not found 
for other occupations, perhaps due to the fact that in these occupations su- 
pervisory intensity is less likely to be set exogenously by local regulatory 
agencies. 
I.  Data 
The data we examine are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
1985 Hospital Industry Wage Survey.  In 1985 the BLS sampled nearly 1,000 
hospitals from 23 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's)  to measure 
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hospital pay and staffing.  Although the original survey contains observa- 
tions from 23 SMSAs,  for confidentiality purposes the BLS provided an extract 
consisting of information on employees of 300 hospitals from a random sample 
of 10 of the SMSAs and concealed the identity of the SMSA. The data were coded 
in such a way,  however,  that it is still possible to identify the groups of 
hospitals that are located in the same SMSAs (i.e., the SMSA code is scrambled 
but unique).  Consequently,  we can control for the SMSA in which the hospital 
is located in our subsequent analysis,  without knowing where the hospital is 
located. 
The survey contains wage and salary information,  union status, and 
some demographic information for employees in selected occupations.  In addi- 
tion, several characteristics of the hospital are reported,  such as the form 
of ownership.  Most importantly, the Hospital Survey is the only BLS industry 
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hours) for supervisory workers.  We focus on four separate 
occupations--registered general duty nurses,  radiographers,  physical thera- 
pists, and food service workers--because the data set allows us to derive the 
average supervisor-to-staff ratio for employees in these occupations.  Fur- 
thermore,  supervisory information for these workers is particularly valuable 
because the lines of supervision are typically standard across hospitals and 
are narrowly drawn for these types of jobs. 
The Data Appendix provides a more detailed description of the data 
set.  Included are precise definitions of the four occupations in our sample, 
the derivation of the full-time equivalent supervisor-to-staff ratio for each 
occupation,  and the means and standard deviations of the relevant variables 
for each occupation. 
11.  Basic Findings 
The Interoccu~ational  Structure of Wages 
To examine the interoccupational structure of wages across hospitals, 
we calculate the average wage paid to employees at the various hospitals for 
each occupation.  Table 1 contains a correlation matrix of the average wage in 
the four occupations across hospitals.  The table shows that the average hos- 
pital wage is highly correlated between pairs of occupations.  For instance, 
the correlation between the average wage of registered nurses and radiogra- 
phers across hospitals is 0.740. 
Although it may not be surprising to find a high degree of correlation 
in wages between two similar occupations, the same pattern appears to hold for 
dissimilar occupations.  For instance, the correlation in wages between regis- 
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tered nurses and food service workers is 0.754.  The average correlation in 
wages among the six different pairings of occupations is 0.673.  These figures 
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of occupation. 
In table 2 we report the correlation between the average wages of 
staff workers and their supervisors in the four occupations.  These results 
also indicate a high degree of similarity in the wage struc'ture  across occupa- 
tions.  For instance, the correlations between the wage of registered nurses 
and their supervisors is 0.805. 
What might explain the high similarity in the interfirm wage structure 
across occupations?  In particular,  what role might supervision play? 
Consider first the human resource management/personnel literature on 
compensation.  This literature stresses three main factors that influence the 
firm's choice of location in the wage hierarchy.  First, internal.  equity is 
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believed to be important in explaining wage differentials.  According to 
this argument, if workers perceive their compensation as less than coworkers 
who are less skilled,  they will become dissatisfied with their job and with- 
hold effort.  Moreover, one might expect a link between supervisor and staff 
wages across establishments because supervisors are likely to be more effec- 
tive when they are paid more than the workers they supervise since pay symbol- 
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izes a worker's  prestige and authority.  If workers in one occupation  of a 
firm are paid relatively well compared to other firms,  workers in the other 
occupations that the firm employs would also be relatively well-paid because 
of vertical equity considerations. 
Second, the traditional personnel literature also places much emphasis 
on the firm's  ability to pay.  Although a cost-minimizing firm would not con- 
sider its ability to pay in setting pay,  workers may be able to extract rents 
from firms through collective bargaining--in which case the firm's  ability to 
pay becomes a relevant factor.  Alternatively,  principal-agent problems may 
lead managers to share product market rents with workers even in the absence 
of collective bargaining. 
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has stressed the interrelationship between management strategy and personnel 
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policy.  Among other factors, the type of supervision and the nature of the 
work that the firm provides would be aspects of managerial strategy taken into 
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account in choosing a spot along the wage hierarchy.  Firms that closely 
monitor and control workers would be able to hire lower-quality workers and to 
pay lower wages than firms that allow workers more autonomy and responsibil- 
ity. 
Next,  consider possible neoclassical economic explanations of the 
observed pattern of interfirm earnings differentials for different occupa- 
tions.  First, there may be working conditions associated with employers that 
cut across all jobs and dictate compensating wage differentials.  For example, 
a firm may be located in a distant or remote section of a city,  which.  causes 
all employees  (regardless  of their occupation) to have a long commute to work 
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and therefore generates a companywide compensating wage differential.  Al- 
ternatively,  the employer may closely supervise all employees to a similar 
extent.  Such a uniform supervisory strategy would necessitate a positive wage 
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premium if employees dislike being monitored. 
Finally, workers may sort themselves into firms--or firms may recruit 
workers--on the basis of their  (unobserved)  ability.  Although the workers' 
abilities are unobserved by the econometrician, the firm may be able to dis- 
criminate among high- and low-ability workers and set their pay accordingly. 
This would lead researchers to erroneously conclude that equally skilled work- 
ers are paid differently.  To the extent that there is uniform,  hospitalwide 
sorting on the basis of unobserved ability in all occupations,  we would ob- 
serve a pattern like the one discussed above.  In addition,  one would suspect 
that firms will more intensively supervise work units that on average have 
low-ability workers. 
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Table 3 reports the correlation in the supervisor-to-staff ratios 
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across hospitals for the various occupations.  In  comparison to the find- 
ings for wages,  we find a much lower correlation in the supervisor-to-staff 
ratio across occupations.  For example, the correlation in the supervisor-to- 
staff ratio between the radiographers and physical therapists among the hospi- 
tals is 0.281.  The average correlation in the supervisor-to-staff ratios 
among the six different pairings of occupations is 0.239. These figures sug- 
gest that hospitals do not follow a general strategy of supervisory intensity 
that cuts across occupations.  Instead,  the extent of supervision  varies 
across occupations in hospitals. 
One potential explanation  for this fact is that the number of supervi- 
sors and/or  staff employees in hospitals is often highly regulated by state 
and local governments.  If the mandated supervisor-to-staff ratio varies by 
occupation  and city,  one would not expect to find a hospitalwide influence on 
the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  On the other hand,  if the supervisor-to-staff 
ratio in all occupations are regulated to a  similar extent in an area, these 
correlations may be biased upward.  Regulations could condition these correla- 
tions.  We return to this point below. 
Nonetheless,  the observed interoccupational structure of supervision 
among the hospitals suggests that the interoccupational wage structure cannot 
be explained by arguments based on the premises that some hospitals tend to 
supervise all of their workers intensively while others tend to supervise 
employees in all occupations less intensively. 
111.  Is There a Trade-Off between Suvervision and Pay? 
There is considerable interest in estimating the relationship between 
supervision and pay.  On the one hand,  a positive relationship between super- 
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and that firms must pay a compensating wage differential to attract workers to 
jobs that are intensively supervised.  Aoki  (1984,  p. 29),  for instance, 
broaches the question of whether there will be compensating wage differentials 
associated with supervision and monitoring in the following way:  "Why do the 
team players [workers] accept the monitor's control,  then?  Since the possi- 
bility of shirking indicates that team members derive some utilities from a 
saving of effort expenditure,  they are unlikely to accept the latter's control 
voluntarily for no compensation." 
On the other hand,  a negative relationship between supervision and pay 
would be consistent with two alternative hypotheses: the efficiency wage hy- 
pothesis and sorting by ability.  First, according to the efficiency wage 
hypothesis, at the same level of effort one would observe a trade-off between 
self-supervision and external monitoring,  where increased monitoring is as- 
sumed to increase the likelihood of detecting poor performance  (see  Shapiro 
and Stiglitz,  1984 and Bulow and Summers,  1986).  This trade-off occurs because 
higher pay induces more self-supervision  (and  less shirking) because workers 
value their jobs more as their pay increases,  while more intensive supervision 
raises the probability that workers who shirk will be disciplined and there- 
fore reduces worker shirking.  Thus,  holding workers' effort level constant, 
the efficiency wage model predicts that increases in monitoring would be asso- 
ciated with lower wages. 
The supervisor-to-staff ratio is an input in monitoring;  a greater 
supervisor-to-staff ratio increases the likelihood that shirking workers will 
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be detected and disciplined.  At a fixed level of effort,  the firm will be 
indifferent between expending an additional dollar on monitoring  (that  is, the 
marginal cost of a supervisor) and paying workers a dollar more in wages since 
both supervision and pay are choice variables to the firm in this model. 
Therefore,  a testable implication of the efficiency wage model is that the 
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wage rate,  all else equal. 
Finally, if there is sorting on the basis of workers' abilities 
(within  occupations),  then we would expect low-ability workers to be super- 
vised more than high-ability workers.  If  low-ability workers are paid less 
than high-ability workers,  and if data are not sufficiently detailed to allow 
one to completely control for workers' abilities, then we would also expect to 
find a negative relationship between wages and the extent of supervision. 
Moreover,  cost-minimizing firms will substitute low-quality labor for 
high-quality labor until the point is reached in which the increased supervi- 
sory costs associated with low-quality workers are exactly off-set by reduc- 
tions in the wage bill.  This model yields the same prediction as the monitor- 
ing efficiency wage model. 
Previous Empirical Implementation 
To test the monitoring efficiency wage model,  Leonard  (1987)  regresses 
the wages of staff workers on the occupation-specific supervisor-to-staff 
ratio for each of six occupations in a sample of high-technology firms in 
California.  His estimates generally indicate a positive,  but statistically 
insignificant,  relationship between pay and supervision.  From this exercise, 
he concludes that there is little evidence in favor of the shirking efficiency 
wage model. 
It is unlikely,  however,  that a regression of the wage rate of staff 
workers on the supervisor-to-staff ratio will yield a material test of the 
effect of monitoring on wages because supervision is a choice variable to the 
firm.  For example, if we assume that hospitals have a Cobb-Douglas production 
0 
function,  with  Q =  fS  ,  where L  is the labor input, S is the input of su- 
pervisors,  and Q is the hospital output, then the first order conditions for 
cost-minimization  will require that: 
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where w is the wage of laborers and r is the wage of supervisors. 
From  (1)  it is apparent that holding the wage of supervisors constant, 
random variations in  w  will induce a positive relationship between staff 
workers' wages and the supervisor-to-staff  ratio even if supervision has no 
direct effect on employee utility or monitoring.  More generally,  any produc- 
tion technology that has a nonzero marginal rate of technical substitution 
between laborers and supervisors will induce a positive relationship between 
wages and the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  As a result of the potential for 
substitution among factors of production,  regressions of the wage rate of 
staff workers on the supervisor-to-staff ratio are likely to reflect "reverse 
causation" since an exogenously high staff wage would lead firms to substitute 
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S workers for L  workers. 
Only if r varies independently of w,  or if the supervisor-to-staff 
ratio is exogenously determined,  will it be possible to statistically identify 
the impact of supervision on wages by regressing the wage rate of staff work- 
ers on  the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  In Leonard's application, it is likely 
that any trade-off between supervision and pay would be biased and perhaps 
dominated by the substitution effect since his data pertain to an industry 
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without external restrictions on S/L. 
Estimation 
The particular institutions of the hospital industry provide some hope 
of identifying the trade-off between supervision and pay that is not biased by 
the substitution of inputs.  This is the case because local regulatory author- 
ities exercise a great deal of indirect and direct authority in setting mini- 
mum standards for the supervisor-to-staff ratio in hospitals.  For instance, 
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one supervisory nurse per 40 patients and provide at least 3.4 hours of gen- 
eral duty nursing time per patient each day.  Other states in our sample that 
regulate staffing requirements for at least some hospital employees include 
California,  Florida,  New York,  Illinois,  and Wisconsin.  In  addition,  some 
cities in our sample have local regulations that restrict a hospital's  author- 
ity to autonomously determine their staffing arrangements.  In many hospitals, 
these regulations are likely to be binding in the sense that hospitals are 
required to use supervisor-to-staff ratios that they would not have voluntar- 
ily chosen in the absence of such regulation. 
For our purposes,  regional variations in the supervisor-to-staff  ratio 
that are generated by state and local government regulations can be used to 
identify the hedonic relationship between wages and supervision. Ideally,  the 
exact level of the government-mandated staffing requirements could be used to 
instrument for the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  However,  since this information 
cannot be matched to our data set because SMSA locations are concealed,  we use 
a set of dummy variables that indicate the SMSA in which the hospital is lo- 
cated in order to instrument for the supervisor-to-staff ratio in hedonic wage 
equations.  Since we assume that government staffing requirements vary exoge- 
nously across SMSAs,  this procedure provides a way to estimate the trade-off 
between wages and supervision without encountering the problems created by the 
endogeneity of the number of supervisors and staff workers. 
A potential limitation  of this approach is that if SMSA location is a 
direct determinant of wages,  hospital location is not a valid instrument for 
supervision.  Thus,  we include a direct measure of the relative wage level in 
each SMSA to control for regional wage effects.  An SMSA wage index was ob- 
tained as follows:  using the full sample of occupations and hospitals, log 
wages of workers were regressed on a set of SMSA dummy variables and occupa- 
tion dummy variables.  The estimated coefficients on the SMSA dummies are the 
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able in the wage equations estimated below.  Table 4  reports two-stage least 
squares estimates of earnings equations for four occupations.  The dependent 
variable is the log of the average staff worker's hourly wage in each 
hospital; the key independent variable is the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  For 
reasons discussed above, the exclusion restriction of SMSA  dummy variables 
--which are correlated with local staffing regulations--allows the identifica- 
tion of the supervisor-to-staff ratio.  Comparable equations estimated by OLS 
are reported in table 5. 
When the equations are estimated by two-stage least squares to account 
for the endogeneity of supervisory intensity,  the supervisor-to-staff ratio 
has a negative, statistically significant effect on the pay of nurses.  The 
OLS  regressions show a much smaller trade-off between pay and supervision for 
registered nurses than the two-stage estimates,  which is likely to result from 
reverse causality in the OLS  regressions.  Moreover, the other three occupa- 
tions,  have small,  statistically insignificant coefficients on the 
supervisor-to-staff ratio.  In these occupations,  either regulation does not 
provide exogenous variation in supervisory intensity,  or no trade-off exists 
between supervision and pay. 
The chi-square statistics reported at the bottom of table 4  indicate 
that the exclusion restrictions fail the Generalized Method of Moments 
over-identification test for the three non-nursing occupations, but pass the 
test at the 5 percent level for nurses.  In other words,  the estimated 
trade-off between pay and supervision is sensitive to the choice of instru- 
ments for the non-nursing occupations, which suggests that the 
supervisor-to-staff ratio is not properly estimated in these occupations.  On 
the other hand, the GMM test lends some support for using hospital location as 
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an instrument for supervisory intensity in the nursing occupation.  This 
finding is also consistent with our understanding of the hospital regulatory 
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ratios for nurses than for other occupations. 
The finding of a negative relationship between pay and supervision for 
nurses suggests that these workers do not receive a compensating differential 
when they are subject to close supervision.  To the contrary,  highly super- 
vised workers tend to earn lower wages than those who are supervised less 
intensively.  This would support either of the following conclusions: 1) firms 
that hire low-quality workers tend to supervise them more intensively;  and 
2)  there is a trade-off between self-monitoring and external supervision  for 
workers of a given quality level. 
The point estimate of the coefficient on the supervisor-to-staff ratio 
indicates a substantial trade-off between pay and supervision  for nurses. For 
example, consider the following calculation  of the wage reduction associated 
with hiring an additional nurse supervisor:  On average, there are 6.5 nurses 
assigned to a supervisor.  Hiring an additional supervisor for the average 
work group will thus reduce the number of nurses monitored by a supervisor to 
3.25 in two work groups.  This would enable the hospital to reduce these staff 
nurses' hourly pay by  13.3 percent.  Using the average nurse's  pay of $12.18 
per hour,  the addition of a new supervisor would therefore lead to a payroll 
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reduction of .I33  x 12.18 x 6.5  = $10.53 per hour. 
Although nontrivial, this cost reduction falls short of the average 
hourly wage of nurse supervisors  ($15.39).  However,  one would not expect the 
optimality condition--which is identical for efficiency wages and labor qual- 
ity models--to hold exactly in this industry since the government often regu- 
lates staff levels in hospitals.  The estimated wage savings associated with 
hiring an additional nurse supervisor suggests that regulations require hospi- 
tals to employ more supervisors than they would voluntarily choose to 
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employ. 
Another means of isolating the trade-off between supervision and pay 
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advantage of such a trade-off.  In particular,  unionized hospitals may be 
limited in their ability to adjust wages and staffing levels,  and 
government-owned  hospitals may not have the same cost-minimization incentives 
as privately-owned institutions.  These considerations suggest that the esti- 
mated trade-off may be stronger for nonunion privately owned hospitals than 
for government and union hospitals.  In results not reported here,  we find 
that both of these predictions are borne out for nurses.  For example, the 
coefficient on the supervisor-to-staff ratio estimated for the subsample of 
privately-owned  hospitals is  -2.068, which is much greater in absolute magni- 
tude than the coefficient estimated for the sample as whole. 
Finally,  turn to the other variables in the wage equations.  The esti- 
mates show that unions have a positive effect on wages in the hospital indus- 
try for most occupations.  Interestingly,  full-time nurses tend to earn lower 
wages than part-time nurses.  Moreover, this pattern was found by the BLS in 
the majority of the cities that were surveyed.  The coefficient on the area 
wage index variables are, as expected,  highly statistically significant and 
are close to one in magnitude.  We note that the coefficients on the hospital 
size dummy variables  (measured  by total hospital employment) and wages vary 
among the occupations. 
IV.  Swnmarv and Conclusion 
This paper has examined the structure of pay and supervision in the 
hospital industry.  The analysis finds that wages paid to employees in differ- 
ent occupations follow a similar pattern among the hospitals.  In contrast, 
correlation coefficients suggest that the interoccupational pattern of super- 
visory intensity  (as  measured by the supervisor-to-staff ratio) is much less 
uniform among hospitals.  Given the unusual amount of state and local govern- 
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difficult to generalize from these results to other industries. 
Regional variations in the supervisor-to-staff ratio are used to iden- 
tify the effect of supervision on the wages of staff workers.  This analysis 
finds that wages of staff nurses tend to fall with the extent of supervision. 
On the other hand,  when we estimate wage equations for three other occupations 
(food  service employees,  radiographers,  and physical therapists),  the effect 
of supervision on pay is found to be statistically insignificant.  The more 
limited government regulation of supervisory intensity in these occupations 
and the rejection of the specification tests suggest that the estimated 
trade-off between supervision  and pay in the nursing occupation might be more 
reliable. 
Since many theoretical models of the labor market  (for  example,  agency 
and efficiency wage models) are predicated on assumptions about supervision, 
it is important to empirically examine the actual impact of supervision on pay 
and productivity.  The analysis presented here suggests that workers do not 
require additional compensation to endure more intensive supervision.  If 
anything,  we find that hospitals that have a greater supervisor-to-staff ratio 
tend to pay lower wages to nurses.  There are two plausible interpretations of 
this finding. 
First,  when staff workers are closely supervised,  firms may substitute 
low-quality/low-pay  workers for high-qualityhigh-pay workers.  Although our 
analysis is intentionally confined to narrowly-defined occupations  (for  exam- 
ple, registered nurses) to limit worker heterogeneity,  there is still scope 
for heterogeneity in worker ability within occupations,  which is observed by 
employers but not reflected in our explanatory variables.  An alternative 
interpretation or our results is that firms trade off between inducing work 
effort from a homogeneous group of employees by paying them a relatively high 
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impossible to distinguish between these two alternative interpretations. 
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Data Appendix 
A.  Descri~tion  of the Data 
The data analyzed are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Industry 
Occupational Wage Surveys of the Hospital Industry in 1985.  Hospitals in 23 
SMSAs were surveyed for the wages paid to certain occupations.  We use a sub- 
sample drawn from 10 of the 23 SMSAs surveyed.  Actual SMSA of origin was 
masked by the BLS,  but unique identifiers were provided to allow the creation 
of SMSA dummy variables. 
The data consist of the wages,  sex,  occupation, and establishment 
identifier of individual employees.  Wages reported are straight-time  hourly 
wages  (no  overtime or shift premia included).  Although confidentiality re- 
strictions prohibit the release of employers' names,  the data include unique 
employer identifiers and the following hospital characteristics:  SIC,  range 
of number of employees in the hospital,  union coverage,  short versus long 
term, and type of ownership  (state,  other government, proprietary,  nonprof- 
it church,  nonprofit-nonchurch,  other). 
We analyze the relationship between wages and supervision in the four 
occupations that have data on supervisors and staff: physical therapists, 
radiographers,  nurses,  and food service workers.  Descriptive statistics for 
the relevant variables by occupation are provided in table Al. 
B.  Construction of Su~ervisor-to-Staff  Ratios for Hosvital Em~lovees 
The measure of supervisory intensity that we use. is simply the number 
of supervisors divided by the number of staff workers in a given occupation 
for each hospital.  The data only allow us to calculate the supervisor-to- 
- - 
staff ratio at the hospital  (rather  than work-group) level.  The following 
conventions were used to obtain the number of workers and supervisors: 
1.  Part-time supervisors are counted as half of a supervisor in the numerator 
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the denominator of the ratio. 
2.  If no supervisors are reported in an occupation,  we assume the hospical 
has one supervisor for that occupation.  This correction is made in less than 
10 percent of the observations.  In  addition,  the results are not sensitive to 
the alternative of treating the supervisor-to-staff ratio as 0 in these cases. 
C.  Definition  of Su~ervisory  and Staff Workers by Occu~ation 
Supervisor and worker definitions for the individual occupations are 
listed below.  BLS Occupational Codes for each job classification are also 
listed. 
1.  Nurses 
a.  Supervisors: 010  director of nursing 
020  supervisor of nurses 
021  supervisor of nurses-day 
022  supervisor of nurses-night 
030  head nurse 
b.  Staff:  040 Registered general duty nurse 
041 LPN-administers medications 
042 LPN-does not administer medications 
043 LPN-psychiatric 
044 LPN-nonpsychiatric 
049 LPN-no information  about medications 
It should'  be noted that although LPNs are included in the denominator 
of the supervisor-to-staff ratio for nurses, the analysis of wages only per- 
tains to registered nurses. 
2.  Food Service Workers 
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b.  Staff:  430 food service worker 
3.  Physical Thera~ists 
a.  Supervisors: 640 physical therapist supervisor 
b.  Staff:  230 physical therapist 
4.  Radiographers 
a.  Supervisors: 270 radiographer supervisor 
b.  Staff:  261 registered radiographer 
262 nonregistered radiographer 
269 radiographer-unknown registration status 
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Correlation of Average Hospital Wage by Occupation,  1985 
(Number  of Hospitals in Parentheses) 
.............................................................................. 
Food  Physical 
Service  Radiographer  Therapist 
.............................................................................. 





Nurse  .754  .740  .517 
(271)  (270)  (226) 
.............................................................................. 
Correlations are of average hourly wage rate.  All of the above correlations 
are statistically significant at the  .0001  level. 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Correlation of Average Staff Workers' Wage with their Supervisor's Wage 
Registered 
Nurse 




Service  .652  2  14 
----__------------d----------------------------------------4------------------ 
Correlations are of average hourly wage rate.  All of the above correlations 
are statistically significant at the  .0001  level. 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Correlation of Supervisor-to-Staff Ratios, 1985 
(Number  of Hospitals in Parentheses) 
Food  Physical 
Service  Radiographer  Therapist 
Radiographer  .116* 
(254) 
Physical 
Therapist  .174**  .281** 
(214)  (219) 
Registered 
Nurse  .160**  .549**  .155** 
(271)  (270)  (226) 
*Statistically significant difference between the correlation and 0  at the .10 
level. 
**Statistically  significant difference between the correlation and 0  at the 
.Ol level. 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Estimates of the Trade-off between Supervision and Pay 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Wage 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimatesa 
.............................................................................. 
Explanatory  Registered  Food  Radiographers  Physical 
variableb  Nurses  Service  Therapists 
Supervisor-to-Staff  -.  866  -.  115  .050  .I14 
Ratio  ( .216)  ( .159)  ( .104)  ( .068) 









Hos~ital  Size 
1 - 99 
1000-2499  -.  005  -.  008  -.  011  .020 
( .020)  ( .020)  ( .019)  ( .021) 
Chi-Square 
Over-Identification  14.7  25.3  91.5  76.2 
Test (DF=8) 
Sample Size  297  273  271  226 
a.  Nine SMSA dummy variables are excluded instruments for the supervisor-to- 
staff ratio. 
b.  Equations also include dummy variables indicating whether the hospital is 
government-owned,  proprietary or nonprofit;  a dummy variable indicating 
whether the hospital is a long-term care facility; two dummy variables indi- 
cating the type of hospital; and an intercept term. 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Estimates of the Trade-off between Supervision and Pay 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Wage 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
.............................................................................. 
Explanatory  Registered  Food  Radiographers  Physical 
Variable  Nurses  Service  Therapists 
Supervisor-to-Staff 
Ratio 










1 - 99 
R~ 
Sample Size 
a. Equations also include dummy variables indicating whether the hospital is 
government-owned,  proprietary or nonprofit;  a dummy variable indicating 
whether the hospital is a long-term care facility; two dummy variables indi- 
cating the type of hospital;  and an intercept term. 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Best available copyAppendix Table A1 
Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable 
- 
Registered  Radiographers  Physical  Food 
Nurses  Therapists  Service 
Hourly Wage of 
Staff 
Hourly Wage of 
Supervisors 
Supervisor-to-Staff  .I52  .239  .389  .I62 
Ratio  ( .143)  ( .312)  ( .426)  ( .184) 









Psychiatric Hospital  .I18  .070  .040  .088 
( .323)  ( .256)  ( .196)  ( .284) 
Specialty Hospital  .094  .085  .lo6  .095 
( .293)  ( .279)  ( .309)  ( .294) 
Hospital Size 
1 - 99  .003  ---  ---  --- 
( .058) 
> 2,500  .I62  .I77  .213  .I76 
(.369)  (.  382)  (.409)  ( .381) 
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1985 BLS Hospital Industry Wage Survey. 
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Of cburse, if workers prefer more supervision to less supervision, one 
would expect just the opposite prediction. 
For further details on the original survey, see Industrv Wave Survey: 
HosD~~~~s  (US  Dept. of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2142,  De- 
cember 1982) and Industrv Wage  -  Survey: HosD~~~~s  (US  Dept. of Labor,  Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2273,  February 1987). 
Other researchers  have found a similar pattern at the industry level. For 
instance,  Dickens and Katz  (1986)  estimate that the correlation in the 
inter-industry wage differential for managers and operatives  (after  control- 
ling for education,  age,  region and other variables) is  .73.  In addition, 
Groshen  (1988)  finds evidence that different occupations have highly corre- 
lated wage across firms in the chemicals,  steel, plastics, wool textiles, 
cotton textiles, and men's and boys' shirts and nightwear industries.  Leonard 
(1987),  however, finds relatively low inter-firm correlations in wages among 6 
occupations in the "high technology" industry, ranging from -.I8 to  .38. 
See Milkovich and Newman (1984), Kochan and Barocci (1985),  and Heneman, 
Schwab, Fossum and Dyer  (1986)  for statements concerning the importance of 
internal equity in pay setting.  See Akerlof and Yellen  (1987)  for an economic 
model of vertical pay equity. 
As Taylor  (1959)  puts it,  "For a man to believe he is in truth 'the 
boss,' he must know he is receiving more pay than the men and women he super- 
vises and,  with few exceptions,  more than any employee in the operation who 
occupies a nonsupervisory job"  (p.  126). 
Kochan and Barocci  (1985)  provide a discussion of the link between mana- 
gerial strategy and personnel policy. 
See Lester  (1952)  for an early statement of the "range theory of wage 
differentials." 
For example, Rees and Shultz  (1970)  find evidence of geographic wage 
differentials across different sections of the Chicago metropolitan area. The 
locations that require a longer commute to work tend to have higher wages.  A 
compelling interpretation of these wage differentials is that they are compen- 
sating wage differentials needed to attract workers to less accessible estab- 
lishments.  Eberts  (1981)  reaches a similar conclusion after examining the 
spatial pattern of wages of municipal employees in the Chicago area. 
Employees may dislike supervision for two reasons: first,  they may con- 
sider supervision a disagreeable intrusion on their privacy and independence; 
second,  supervisors may exact more work effort from workers than they would 
provide in the absence of supervision. 
lo  See the appendix for a description of the calculation of 
supervisor-to-staff ratios for each occupation. 
Odiorne  (1963, p. 30) defines a supervisor's tasks to include organizing 
work, planning performance targets,  and "...checking  the actual performance 
and noting its quality level and direction against his previously set plan". 
l2  We ignore issues concerning monopsony power,  which might be relevant in 
the labor market for nurses  (see  Sullivan,  1987). 
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Best available copyl3  Ehrenberg  (1974)  finds that hospitals substitute registered nurses (RN1s) 
for licensed practical nurses  (LPNs)  when the wage of LPNs is high relative to 
RNs,  especially in private-for-profit hospitals.  It is likely that substitu- 
tion also takes place between nurse supervisors and registered nurses.  Esti- 
mating Ehrenberg's model with our data,  we find a high elasticity of substitu- 
tion between registered nurses and supervisors, nearly -4. 
l4  Leonard notes that cost minimization implies that w =  Q/L. Therefore,  if 
Q could be held constant in his analysis, the regression of w on S/L  would 
trace-out the trade-off between supervision and pay along an isoquant. How- 
ever, given data limitations he must proxy for Q  with the total employment of 
the firm,  which is likely to be a very imprecise measure of output. 
l5  We note that if the equations are re-estimated excluding the area wage 
index, the over-identification test is overwhelmingly rejected for the sample 
of nurses. 
l6 This calculation assumes that productivity is constant. 
l7  Integer restrictions on the number of nurse supervisors is probably not a 
relevant constraint in this situation since hospitals could hire part-time 
supervisors. 
l8  We note that the estimated effect of the supervisor-to-staff ratio was 
not sensitive to counting part-time staff members as equivalent to full-time 
staff members,  or by counting LPNs as less than RNs. 
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